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Al Jazeera English · Panel debate · 0h 46m · Rubric v0.11

The full transcript

US-Israeli war on Iran: built on lies? | Mehdi Hasan and David Des Roches and panelists

Every turn as spoken, with every scored moment printed where it happened: nothing here requires trust. Rulings link to their scorecard rows for the arithmetic; timestamps open the recording at that moment.

250 turns · 34 points · 17 scored events (+2 low-confidence, excluded from score, printed anyway)

Mehdi Hasan00:00:05 · U-001

Operation Epic Fury. Donald Trump's so-called little excursion in Iran dragged from days to weeks to months and unleashed death, destruction, and an economic meltdown. After more than 100 days of strikes, retaliation, and escalating tensions, the United States and Iran have agreed to cease hostilities. We just made a great settlement of— The war with Iran. So is this really the victory Donald Trump claims, or is it a costly failure? And when it comes to US policy in the Middle East, who's calling the shots? Trump or Benjamin Netanyahu? My guest tonight is a retired US colonel who has spent decades helping shape America's foreign policy in various roles at the Department of Defense. He said that Operation Epic Fury, while imperfect, Should be considered a success. I'm Mehdi Hassan, and tonight I'll go head to head with David DeRoche, the former head of the Pentagon's Directorate for the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula. In our interview, recorded shortly before the announcement of a deal between the United States and Iran, I challenged him on the consequences of the war, Iran's nuclear ambitions, and the U.S.'s role in the region. I was also joined. by 3 experts. Mohammad Ali Shebani, a Middle East scholar and editor of the London-based news outlet Amwaj.media, focused on Iran, Iraq, and the Arabian Peninsula. Barak Sina, an associate research fellow at the national security think tank, the Henry Jackson Society. And Sanam Naraghi-Andalini, the British-Iranian founder and CEO of the International Civil Society Action Network. Welcome to The Real News Network. David Derouiche, thank you for joining me on Head to Head tonight. A lot to talk about. The U.S. war on Iran, it was launched over 3 months ago. It's failed to achieve most of its main goals. Most people think it is a disaster. And yet, in an op-ed for Fox News, a few weeks ago. You called it imperfect, but still a success. How so?

P1 raised · importance ×3 · score on the scorecard ▸

Burden: war a success. The crux: 'Operation Epic Fury, while imperfect, should be considered a success': defend it, retreat from it with reasons, or concede it.

David Des Roches00:02:25 · U-002

Yeah, good question. So we have to recognize that we have perfect information or semi-perfect information on what's coming from one side, and we only get curated information from the other side. We're starting to see more information now that the internet lookout is coming up. But the objectives—

Mehdi Hasan00:02:43 · U-003

You think the Iranian side is giving curated imperfect information?

David Des Roches00:02:47 · U-004

Absolutely.

Mehdi Hasan00:02:48 · U-005

And the Trump administration is giving perfect information?

David Des Roches00:02:51 · U-006

Trump administration. The Trump administration is trying to shape the information, but they're in an environment of an open press where there's people asking difficult questions.

Mehdi Hasan00:02:58 · U-007

So how do you measure it as a success?

+6 C-3.1 · Direct answer to how success is measured · David Des Roches

David Des Roches00:03:00 · U-008

So there are 4 objectives going in. I measure it on its own terms. So first off, regime change was not the aim of this campaign. So there were 4 objectives. The first is to destroy the air defense network. That has pretty much been done, and when it was trying to be reconstituted, we saw the Israeli strikes were aimed at that. The second was to set back the nuclear program, preferably destroy it, to a point where it cannot be easily reconstituted. The third was to degrade or destroy Iran's drone and missile capability. We have not seen militarily significant missile launches. And then the fourth was to deplete the regime, particularly the internal security aspects of the regime, so that if there is an uprising, it wouldn't go through. So at the time I wrote that, which admittedly was in the 5th week of a 2-week war, most of those objectives I think had been achieved.

P1 raised again here · first raised at U-001

Verdict on P1 · David Des Roches confronted it · the scorecard row ▸

Asked how he measures success, Des Roches defended his burden by laying out four concrete objectives and assessing each as substantially achieved. Defends the resolution directly.

Mehdi Hasan00:03:51 · U-009

So you are on record claiming this war has significantly weakened Iran.

P2 raised · importance ×3 · score on the scorecard ▸

Iran not significantly weakened. The crux: Given Iran retains ~70% of missiles, 90% underground storage, ~1000lb HEU, and replaced Khamenei with another Khamenei, defend or retract that Iran was significantly weakened.

David Des Roches00:03:55 · U-010 · low-confidence transcription

Yeah.

Mehdi Hasan00:03:56 · U-011

But according to US intelligence, Iran still has 70% of its pre-war missile inventory, 90% of its underground missile storage, and of course almost 1,000 pounds of highly enriched uranium. The US killed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and replaced him with, drum roll, Ayatollah Khamenei.

P2 raised again here · first raised at U-009

David Des Roches00:04:13 · U-012

We think.

Mehdi Hasan00:04:14 · U-013

Well, they did replace him. You can say where he is. We can discuss that. The Iranians, much to Donald Trump's shock and surprise, weaponized the Strait of Hormuz, attacked US's Gulf allies, threw the global economy into disarray. In what fantasy world is this war close to a success?

P2 raised again here · first raised at U-009

David Des Roches00:04:30 · U-014

Okay. So again, the 4 terms, the 4 conditions. Let's start with the ballistic missiles. The measure of the effectiveness of ballistic missiles is not how many you have, how many you possess, it's how many you can fire against an enemy in a militarily significant manner.

P3 raised · importance ×2 · score on the scorecard ▸

Missile effectiveness metric. The crux: Ballistic-missile threat is measured by militarily significant strikes fired, not inventory held; defend that the strikes on Gulf bases had no significant effect on US power projection.

Verdict on P2 · David Des Roches half-answered it · 1.2 DIS · the scorecard row ▸

He reframes weakening away from inventory toward militarily significant firepower and power-projection effect, engaging the missile portion of the challenge; he does not address the HEU stockpile or the Khamenei-replacement element of the crux.

importance ×3 × (1 − 0.5 earned) = 1.5 of 55 weighted challenge points · × 45% (crux share of DIS) = −1.2 DIS

David Des Roches00:04:49 · U-016

Yes, and that had almost no effect really on the United States' ability to project power in the region. And again, going back to my initial predicate, Donald Trump at least, he sees defeat, regime change, not coming from military action.

P3 raised again here · first raised at U-014

Verdict on P3 · David Des Roches confronted it · the scorecard row ▸

He affirms his own metric and defends that the Gulf-base strikes had almost no effect on US power projection.

↳ evidence for the P2 verdict on David Des Roches · ruling prints at U-014

Mehdi Hasan00:05:05 · U-017

So, let's talk about that.

David Des Roches00:05:07 · U-018

Sure.

Mehdi Hasan00:05:07 · U-019

Here's what I don't get. You seem to believe, you've made statements to suggest, and you can correct me if I'm wrong, that you actually believe that Trump had humanitarian motives for this illegal and disastrous war. You have claimed that Trump's promise in January to help Iranian protesters who were being killed was the real reason for this war, and you said his aim in this war is, quote, punishing the people who carried out the massacres, and ultimately avenging them, you said. To be clear, David Derouiche, you think Donald Trump gives a damn about the people of Iran?

P4 raised · importance ×2 · score on the scorecard ▸

Trump's motive for war. The crux: You wrote Trump aimed to help/avenge Iranian protesters; defend that this motivated the war, or accept it was ego/other motives, not humanitarian.

David Des Roches00:05:38 · U-020 · low-confidence transcription

Really?

David Des Roches00:05:38 · U-021

Okay, so part of— first off, I'm very impressed that you pay attention to me as a married man. I don't get that very often. But the predicate that you led with is false. What I said is true, that he said he was doing that, not— but I don't think And Trump supporters and Trump detractors, I don't think his motivation is necessarily a humanitarian urge. I haven't seen any evidence that that exists in it. It is his ego. He made a public statement that he was going to help the supporters, and having made that, he had to take some sort of action, not necessarily out of humanitarian urge, but rather because he did not want to be compared with Barack Obama's red lines in Syria. So the action is the same.

P4 raised again here · first raised at U-019

Verdict on P4 · David Des Roches conceded it · the scorecard row ▸

He grants that Trump's motive was not humanitarian but ego, which is the substance Hasan pressed, while maintaining the action followed regardless.

+3 C-1.2 · Conceded Trump's motive was ego, not humanitarian · David Des Roches · low confidence: excluded from score

Mehdi Hasan00:06:24 · U-022

But you would agree that you cannot, quote, avenge Iranians? by killing more Iranians? 1,700 civilians killed in this US-Israeli war according to the most credible study. They've hit a dozen hospitals, 60 universities, 300 healthcare facilities, 760 schools. They blew up a civilian bridge on the first day of this war. As you know, the United States carried out what is probably a war crime by massacring more than 120 kids in an elementary school.

P5 raised · importance ×2 · score on the scorecard ▸

Cannot avenge Iranians by killing them. The crux: With ~1,700 civilians killed and hospitals/schools/universities hit, defend or retract that the war 'avenges' or helps the Iranian people.

David Des Roches00:06:48 · U-023

So first off, again, We will not know for sure what is— I lived through the period of, in the Clinton administration, where we had strikes on Iraq, which was also under sanctions. Those were reported as baby milk factories, and after the fact, we saw that that wasn't quite the same there. I think when we're dealing with an authoritarian regime that has control over the media, and a policy of holding neutral journalists as hostages, Like Jason Rezlan, the reporter for The Washington Post.

Verdict on P5 · David Des Roches talked around it · 1.4 DIS · the scorecard row ▸

He responds by casting doubt on the reliability of Iranian casualty figures under an authoritarian regime; he never addresses the crux's proposition that killing Iranians cannot 'avenge' or help the Iranian people.

importance ×2 × (1 − 0.15 earned) = 1.7 of 55 weighted challenge points · × 45% (crux share of DIS) = −1.4 DIS

Mehdi Hasan00:07:21 · U-024

But there's no debate about the school.

David Des Roches00:07:22 · U-025

Well, the school we can talk about.

Mehdi Hasan00:07:24 · U-026

In fact, well, let's talk about the school. In the days following the attack on the school, you were on Twitter casting doubt that a US strike was responsible for blowing up a school full of children in Minab. A preliminary US internal military investigation confirms it was a US missile. Do you now acknowledge that you were wrong, that the US was responsible for this horrific massacre?

P6 raised · importance ×2 · score on the scorecard ▸

Minab school strike: acknowledge error. The crux: You cast doubt a US strike hit the Minab school; a preliminary US investigation confirms a US missile: concede you were wrong or defend continued doubt.

David Des Roches00:07:43 · U-027

Hold on. So first off, massacre implies intent. So, what you're asking me to agree to is a statement that the people who dropped a round in the context of 800 airstrikes intended to strike a school knowing it was a school. I can't agree with that. But secondly, at the time, people were taking just the word of the regime. We didn't know what we knew then about missiles and sorts.

David Des Roches00:08:10 · U-029

I accept that I may be wrong. We do not know for sure.

P6 raised again here · first raised at U-026

Verdict on P6 · David Des Roches confronted it · the scorecard row ▸

He declines to concede he was wrong and defends continued doubt with a stated reason (uncertainty over the fact), a branch the crux allowed.

Mehdi Hasan00:08:13 · U-030

You still don't know if—

David Des Roches00:08:14 · U-031

you still think it might not be a U.S. missile? I think that it might— Well, hold on. This is going to sound Jesuitical to you, but the word you used is massacre, which implies an element of intent. I think the worst-case scenario—

P6 raised again here · first raised at U-026

↳ evidence for the P6 verdict on David Des Roches · ruling prints at U-029

Mehdi Hasan00:08:26 · U-032

You do realize that even without intent, something can still be a war crime if it's reckless?

P7 raised · importance ×2 · score on the scorecard ▸

War crime needs recklessness not intent. The crux: A strike killing children can be a war crime through recklessness even absent intent; confront that 'massacre'/'war crime' does not require intent.

David Des Roches00:08:30 · U-033

Well, but there is a key definition in there, which is the level of care and the level of carelessness. In a country that is determined to commit war crimes, you would have, in the context of 800 airstrikes, you would have more than one school hit in the first night.

Verdict on P7 · David Des Roches confronted it · the scorecard row ▸

He engages the recklessness standard directly, arguing the dispositive question is the level of care and carelessness rather than intent, and disputing that recklessness was present.

Mehdi Hasan00:08:46 · U-034

Hold on. Unfortunately, I've got more.

David Des Roches00:08:48 · U-035 · low-confidence transcription

Hold on.

Mehdi Hasan00:08:48 · U-036

On February 28th—

+0.5 R-6.1 · Cutting in to hold the floor · David Des Roches

David Des Roches00:08:48 · U-037

Hold on.

Mehdi Hasan00:08:49 · U-038

No, no, you made a point.

David Des Roches00:08:50 · U-039 · low-confidence transcription

Okay, okay, fair enough.

Mehdi Hasan00:08:50 · U-040

On February 28th, the Pentagon used missiles untested in combat, according to New York Times, that bombed a sports hall used by a female volleyball team. They killed 21 people, including multiple children. That was also on the first day of the war. We just didn't know about it till weeks later because the United States government covered it up. It required the New York Times to use satellite imagery to find this out.

P9 raised · importance ×1 · score on the scorecard ▸

Sports hall strike, 21 killed, covered up. The crux: On Feb 28 a US strike hit a female volleyball team's sports hall killing 21 incl. children, concealed until NYT satellite imagery: address whether this occurred and was justified.

+1 C-4.1 · Acknowledged unfamiliarity with the sports-hall strike · David Des Roches

David Des Roches00:09:09 · U-041

I am unfamiliar with that incident, but I will tell you that if your crack research team gets on it, you will see that there were instances where the besieged moved from their headquarters into sports halls as sheltering positions.

P9 raised again here · first raised at U-040

Verdict on P9 · David Des Roches talked around it · 0.7 DIS · the scorecard row ▸

He acknowledges he does not know the incident and offers a speculative human-shields justification; he neither confirms/denies the occurrence nor addresses whether it was justified.

importance ×1 × (1 − 0.15 earned) = 0.9 of 55 weighted challenge points · × 45% (crux share of DIS) = −0.7 DIS

Mehdi Hasan00:09:21 · U-042

This sounds like a very Israeli argument here, that they brought it on themselves with human shields.

David Des Roches00:09:26 · U-043

No, that's not what I'm saying.

Mehdi Hasan00:09:27 · U-044

In fact, here's what you did say, David. You said on Twitter, Wikipedia says the Minab school is located 600 meters from the headquarters of the IRGC Navy Arzif Brigade and used to be part of the base.

Mehdi Hasan00:09:40 · U-046

Which sounds like you're justifying the massacre of kids by saying, well, the military base was nearby, so it's their fault. I would point out to you that a U.S. Marine Corps base in Quantico, Virginia, is very close to the Crossroads Elementary School.

P8 raised · importance ×2 · score on the scorecard ▸

Base-proximity does not justify strike. The crux: A nearby IRGC base does not legitimize hitting a separate school (cf. Quantico/Bramcote near schools); defend or retract that base placement makes the strike legitimate.

David Des Roches00:09:54 · U-047

Yeah.

Mehdi Hasan00:09:54 · U-048

If the Iranians or one of their proxies, God forbid, bombed Crossroads Elementary School and said, well, it was the U.S. Marine Corps' fault for building a base near the school, we would all condemn that. So would you, wouldn't you?

P8 raised again here · first raised at U-046

David Des Roches00:10:05 · U-049

Well, first off, Let's take a step back and assume that the United States deliberately wanted to kill children in a school. I didn't say that. No, but let's just assume this, okay? Why would you assault a regional headquarters that has no influence on policy when you could kill the children of the regime leaders in Tehran? So clearly, it does not make sense if you assume the worst intent, but going forward, the size of the Quantico base, Or any other standard U.S. versus the size of the Minab base are fundamentally different.

Verdict on P8 · David Des Roches confronted it · the scorecard row ▸

He defends the strike's legitimacy on the ground that the school was originally part of the base and used for military purposes, engaging the base-proximity proposition rather than sidestepping it.

Mehdi Hasan00:10:40 · U-050

But all the evidence shows that it was very clear to anyone who bothered to check that this was a school, that it was separate from the base, and that's where the recklessness comes in.

P8 raised again here · first raised at U-046

David Des Roches00:10:48 · U-051

Au contraire. Take a look at the aerial photographs of the base. The difference between—

Mehdi Hasan00:10:52 · U-052

Sky News went to the base.

David Des Roches00:10:53 · U-053

The difference—

Mehdi Hasan00:10:53 · U-054

New York Times looked at the base.

David Des Roches00:10:55 · U-055 · low-confidence transcription

Yes.

David Des Roches00:10:55 · U-056

So look at the photograph, and what you'll see is that there is a smaller base with a perimeter around it. The school was originally part of that base and was used for military purposes.

↳ evidence for the P8 verdict on David Des Roches · ruling prints at U-049

Mehdi Hasan00:11:05 · U-057

Until 2016, it was very clear on satellite imagery it was not part of the base. Let's stay on this subject because it's an important subject. And let's bring in our panel. And I want to bring in Barak Sina, who's an associate research fellow at the national security think tank, the Henry Jackson Society. Barak, you also seem to have justified this massacre at the school by US airstrikes. I watched a speech you recently gave in London. at an Iranian diaspora pro-war rally. You said, quote, the location of the Revolutionary Guards base was the real war crime.

P8 raised again here · first raised at U-046

Mehdi Hasan00:11:37 · U-059

Just to be clear, I just did some checking before I came here, like I did with David. There is a Church of England primary school just minutes away from the Bramcote military barracks in Nuneaton. Is that a war crime by the British Ministry of Defense? to put their base near a primary school?

P8 raised again here · first raised at U-046

Barak Seener00:11:56 · U-060

In the context of a conflict, if somebody does their due diligence, they attempt to prevent civilian casualties, and their target is an IRGC base, then it is a legitimate target. The collateral damage may be tragic, but the actual strike Is completely legitimate.

P8 raised again here · first raised at U-046

Verdict on P8 · Barak Seener confronted it · the scorecard row ▸

He defends that a strike on an IRGC base is a legitimate target and casualties are collateral, directly affirming the base-proximity justification.

Mehdi Hasan00:12:21 · U-061

Did you really come to a public gathering to refer to 120 dead kids as collateral damage?

Barak Seener00:12:25 · U-062

Look, that might be the— it might be— I said the word tragic as well, but that is what it is.

Mehdi Hasan00:12:31 · U-063

Collateral damage? 120 Iranian kids killed in the war?

Barak Seener00:12:34 · U-064

Of course that is collateral damage. Collateral damage means the unintended consequences of a strike.

Mehdi Hasan00:12:39 · U-065

But you do realize, as I explained to David, it could still be a war crime.

P7 raised again here · first raised at U-032

Barak Seener00:12:42 · U-066

I said in the very beginning that if you don't take your due diligence to attempt to take every measure to prevent civilian casualties, then it would be a war crime. I would assume that every attempt would have been taken to prevent that from happening.

Verdict on P7 · Barak Seener confronted it · the scorecard row ▸

He denies the crux's separation of recklessness from intent, asserting 'Recklessness is intent,' and states the due-diligence test for when a strike becomes a war crime.

Mehdi Hasan00:12:59 · U-067

So how do they end up killing 120 kids on day one?

Barak Seener00:13:02 · U-068

I don't know why you would want to assume that that was the intent.

Mehdi Hasan00:13:08 · U-069

I never said a word about intent. I've been very clear. It's not about intent. It's about reckless behavior.

P7 raised again here · first raised at U-032

Barak Seener00:13:12 · U-070

No, no, no.

David Des Roches00:13:13 · U-071

But if you use the word intent— You do assume an intent. If you use the word massacre, you do assume an intent.

P7 raised again here · first raised at U-032

↳ evidence for the P7 verdict on David Des Roches · ruling prints at U-033

Mehdi Hasan00:13:18 · U-072

That's not true at all.

Mehdi Hasan00:13:20 · U-074

I want to bring in Sanam Naraghi-Andalini, who's a British-Iranian founder and CEO of the International Civil Society Action Network. A lot of this war was sold as a way of freeing the people of Iran, as saving them after many of them were killed in January. And then we had this incident on day one. What did you make of it? And what do you make of what you've heard so far?

Sanam Naraghi-Anderlini00:13:39 · U-075

So first of all, I think What we know is that it was also a double-tap incident. So let's say that they didn't know that it was a school. Let's assume that it was AI that told them that, you know, with old data, that this was 10 years ago, was an IRGC base. Let's, let's just give you that. But it was a double-tap, meaning that they hit one missile, people came to save the kids, and then the second missile went in. So— It is a massacre. It is a war crime. Whether it was intentional or not, we don't— let's hope it wasn't, although your missiles are very targeted from what we understand. And it was reckless. Now, the other thing that we don't talk about, and I think it's important in terms of whether civilians were deliberately targeted or not, is that 2/3 of the targets in Tehran, which is a city of 9 million, were civilian targets.

P10 raised · importance ×2 · score on the scorecard ▸

Double-tap and civilian targeting. The crux: The school was a double-tap strike and 2/3 of Tehran targets were civilian: confront whether this indicates a war crime and deliberate civilian targeting.

Verdict on P10 · David Des Roches wasn't asked · the scorecard row ▸

The double-tap/civilian-targeting point was raised by a panelist late in part 1; the floor moved to other panelists and Des Roches was not given an opportunity to respond. Silence on a panel is not evasion.

Verdict on P10 · Barak Seener wasn't asked · the scorecard row ▸

Raised by a panelist; Seener was not given the floor to respond before the segment moved on.

Mehdi Hasan00:14:31 · U-076

Let me bring in Mohammad Ali Shebani, who is a Middle East scholar, editor of the London-based news outlet, Amwaj.media, which focuses on Iran-Iraq. the Arabian Peninsula. What do you make of David's key argument, I think, at the start of this show, that the war is a success because Iran has been degraded, has been weakened? You are someone who studied Iran and Iran's government for a long time. Do you share that view?

Mohammad Ali Shabani00:14:51 · U-077

I think all the data that's out there shows that there's a level of resilience in Iran, not just reference to the military, also the political leadership. You have a new Supreme Leader, another Khamenei. You have intact government. You have continuity of governance. You see continued retaliatory attacks against the US military after 3 months of war. Iran's military's budget is 130 times less than the United States. It's not even a peer. It's not even anything close to a peer. We see that this war really is about a war of attrition. It's about different methods of war.

P11 raised · importance ×2 · score on the scorecard ▸

Iran's resilience refutes 'weakened'. The crux: Iran shows continuity (new Supreme Leader, intact government, continued retaliation after 3 months, budget 130x smaller than US) confront whether it was actually degraded.

Verdict on P11 · David Des Roches wasn't asked · the scorecard row ▸

Shabani's resilience argument was made in the panel segment; the host moved to the next speaker and Des Roches was not given the floor to answer it specifically. His earlier weakening thesis (P2) predates this point.

Mehdi Hasan00:15:22 · U-078

Okay. The reality is that there was no nuclear threat from Iran last year when we bombed them or this year when we bombed them. When the Trump administration says we went to war to avert a, quote, I'm quoting, imminent nuclear threat. That is a lie from the United States government, is it not?

P12 raised · importance ×3 · score on the scorecard ▸

No imminent nuclear threat: Trump lied. The crux: US intelligence and IAEA found Iran was not building a weapon and Khamenei had not authorized it; confront that 'imminent nuclear threat' was false.

David Des Roches00:15:41 · U-080

I think what you're probably referring to is the earlier intelligence estimate that said Iran is not seeking to build a nuclear weapon at this time.

Verdict on P12 · David Des Roches half-answered it · 1.2 DIS · the scorecard row ▸

He pivots the dispute to reconstitution capability and concedes imminence is arguable ('Imminent, we can argue over'), engaging part of the crux while not defending that an imminent threat existed.

importance ×3 × (1 − 0.5 earned) = 1.5 of 55 weighted challenge points · × 45% (crux share of DIS) = −1.2 DIS

Mehdi Hasan00:15:50 · U-081

Yes, and the IAEA is the same.

David Des Roches00:15:52 · U-082

And the issue, the key part there, everybody focuses on the first part and ignores the second part. Iran does have the capability to reconstitute, or did have the capability to reconstitute its nuclear program At a moment's notice, we know that they had one prior to 2003. They suspended it.

P13 raised · importance ×2 · score on the scorecard ▸

Capability itself is a threat. The crux: Iran's capability to reconstitute a weapons program 'at a moment's notice' constitutes a threat justifying action: defend this against the year-plus timeline / imminence objection.

Verdict on P13 · David Des Roches confronted it · the scorecard row ▸

He defends his own proposition that reconstitution capability itself is a threat.

Mehdi Hasan00:16:08 · U-083

If your moment is a year, then yes. You were with respect a moment ago lecturing me on the meaning of the word massacre. I would say to you the meaning of the word imminent to most people is not years from now.

+4.5 C-1.2 · Partial concession on imminence · David Des Roches

David Des Roches00:16:19 · U-084

You give me a massacre, I'll take imminent.

Mehdi Hasan00:16:20 · U-085

That was a lie from the Trump administration. And as you say, U.S. intelligence confirmed that Iran was not building a nuclear weapon—not just not building a nuclear weapon—and I'm quoting here Supreme Leader Khamenei. has not authorized the nuclear weapons program. He hadn't changed his mind.

P12 raised again here · first raised at U-078

David Des Roches00:16:34 · U-086

But, but the capability, the capacity, the ability to do that—

P13 raised again here · first raised at U-082

+0.5 R-6.1 · Interruption · Mehdi Hasan

Mehdi Hasan00:16:38 · U-087

Capability is still a threat.

Mehdi Hasan00:16:45 · U-089

So let me ask you about where the president's going. Donald Trump wants to sign a deal. He wants to sign a deal that prevents Iran from getting highly enriched uranium, a deal that he says in which they pledge never to build nuclear weapons.

Mehdi Hasan00:16:57 · U-091

The US already had this deal. It was called the JCPOA, which I know you didn't like. The UN's nuclear watchdog, the IAEA, said the deal was working. Iran was in compliance. They were enriching at 3.67%. And yet Trump tore it up. Here we are at war, trying to get a deal that will be nowhere near as good as that deal.

P15 raised · importance ×3 · score on the scorecard ▸

JCPOA nuclear provisions worked. The crux: The IAEA said the deal worked and Iran was compliant at 3.67% enrichment; confront that the nuclear component of the JCPOA was working before Trump tore it up.

David Des Roches00:17:16 · U-092

Well, it may have been a good deal on one specific issue, but my criticism of the JCPOA was the United States had one main advantage, one main tool to deal with Iranian behavior, that was sanctions. We have 3 or 4 issues that go back across administrations. One was the use of proxies. Recall the Syrian Civil War was going on at the time. Iranian forces and Iranian officer militias, Hezbollah, were there.

P16 raised · importance ×2 · score on the scorecard ▸

JCPOA was a bad deal. The crux: By focusing only on nuclear and giving sanctions relief, the JCPOA licensed proxies/missiles/human-rights abuses: defend that this made it a bad deal.

Mehdi Hasan00:17:41 · U-093 · low-confidence transcription

Yes.

David Des Roches00:17:42 · U-094

Another was the ballistic missile, which is actually of more concern to our Gulf allies than the nuclear program. And then of course, there's the ongoing nature of the government, human rights, things of that nature.

P16 raised again here · first raised at U-092

Mehdi Hasan00:17:51 · U-095

But your argument is the JCPOA didn't cover these issues, so it was a bad deal.

David Des Roches00:17:54 · U-096

Look, let me tell you how bad it was. So we focused on the nuclear issue, we gave them license everywhere else.

P16 raised again here · first raised at U-092

Verdict on P15 · David Des Roches talked around it · 2.1 DIS · the scorecard row ▸

He declines to address whether the nuclear provisions worked, stating he did not pay attention to that component and redirecting to other JCPOA issues. The crux, whether the nuclear bit was working, is acknowledged but never addressed.

importance ×3 × (1 − 0.15 earned) = 2.6 of 55 weighted challenge points · × 45% (crux share of DIS) = −2.1 DIS

Verdict on P16 · David Des Roches confronted it · the scorecard row ▸

He defends his own claim that the deal was bad because it addressed only nuclear while sanctions relief licensed proxies, missiles and abuses.

Mehdi Hasan00:18:00 · U-097

But do you agree that the nuclear bit worked before we go to the other bit?

P15 raised again here · first raised at U-091

+3 C-4.1 · Acknowledged uncertainty · David Des Roches

David Des Roches00:18:03 · U-098

I honestly didn't pay enough attention to it because I was focused on the other issues.

↳ evidence for the P15 verdict on David Des Roches · ruling prints at U-096

Mehdi Hasan00:18:07 · U-099

You didn't pay attention to it? We're at war because of it.

David Des Roches00:18:08 · U-100

Let me tell you, no, we're not. We're not at war. That's even better.

Mehdi Hasan00:18:11 · U-101

We're not at war.

David Des Roches00:18:12 · U-102

I just laid out—

+0.5 R-6.1 · Interruption · Mehdi Hasan

David Des Roches00:18:15 · U-104

4 issues there, and at the start of the program, I laid out 4 issues. This is one of 4, but I also just said that, for example, our partners in the region are more concerned about ballistic missiles than nuclear. So, the problem was JCPOA gave them sanction relief. They, one example, they got Boeing aircraft parts. They used those to fly militias into Syria. They ethnically cleansed the western suburbs of Damascus of Sunni Muslims and replaced them with Shia militiamen drawn from other countries. That was all enabled under the JCPOA. If the JCPOA had been kept in power, Bashar al-Assad would still be ruling Damascus. He'd still be barrel bombing his political opponents.

P17 raised · importance ×2 · score on the scorecard ▸

JCPOA enabled Syria ethnic cleansing. The crux: Defend the claim that JCPOA sanctions relief (e.g. Boeing parts) enabled Iranian ethnic cleansing in Damascus and that Assad would still rule had it stood.

P16 raised again here · first raised at U-092

Verdict on P17 · David Des Roches confronted it · the scorecard row ▸

He defends his own claim that JCPOA relief enabled Iranian ethnic cleansing in Damascus and that Assad would still rule had it stood.

↳ evidence for the P16 verdict on David Des Roches · ruling prints at U-096

Mehdi Hasan00:18:57 · U-105

That's an absurd claim. You can't possibly know that, and many would argue if the JCPOA was still there, we wouldn't be in this war killing school kids and calling it collateral damage.

P17 raised again here · first raised at U-104

David Des Roches00:19:04 · U-106

The JCPOA would have expired last year.

P18 raised again here · first raised at U-107

Verdict on P18 · David Des Roches talked around it · 0.7 DIS · the scorecard row ▸

He asserts the deal 'would have expired last year' but never engages Hasan's specific 2030 sunset correction; the host then pivoted to the panel. The date dispute itself went unaddressed.

importance ×1 × (1 − 0.15 earned) = 0.9 of 55 weighted challenge points · × 45% (crux share of DIS) = −0.7 DIS

Mehdi Hasan00:19:06 · U-107

That's not true. You know the sunset clause on nuclear enrichment was till 2030. Check the date, David. It's 2026. Let's bring in our panel. Mohammad Ali Shabani, JCPOA, it gave away the house. It gave away our leverage. It caused the ethnic cleansing in Syria.

P18 raised · importance ×1 · score on the scorecard ▸

JCPOA expiry date dispute. The crux: The enrichment sunset ran to 2030, not 'last year': confront the factual date of the JCPOA's nuclear sunset clause.

Mohammad Ali Shabani00:19:21 · U-108 · low-confidence transcription

It enabled.

David Des Roches00:19:22 · U-109

Enabled.

Mohammad Ali Shabani00:19:23 · U-110

Dave, I think, look, you're a political scientist. You've been in the military. I think you are well aware that threat is about capability plus intent. It's not just capability. Israel has tried to make it about capability, which means that every single nation in the region is basically a potential threat down the line. now including Turkey. You can bomb an enrichment plant. The threat, if you think of it as capability, is not about the physical structure. It's about the scientists. It's about the universities. Iran has thousands of nuclear scientists. As long as you're going to approach the nuclear issue as an issue to do with capability, you will never resolve it. There is no possible solution for it. The United States will lose from the outset of any such kind of endeavor, because fundamentally, structurally, you cannot go after knowledge. You cannot bomb knowledge, right? We cannot change the definition of threat, 'cause once you start doing that, you kind of just open the box and all kinds of things come out of there.

P14 raised · importance ×2 · score on the scorecard ▸

Threat = capability + intent; can't bomb knowledge. The crux: Threat requires capability plus intent; nuclear knowledge/scientists cannot be bombed away: confront that a capability-only definition makes the problem unsolvable.

Verdict on P14 · David Des Roches wasn't asked · the scorecard row ▸

Shabani's 'can't bomb knowledge / capability+intent' argument was made in the panel segment; the host moved on and Des Roches was not given the floor to respond.

Mehdi Hasan00:20:13 · U-111

Let me bring in, uh, Barack. The truth is, Barack, this was never about the Iranian nuclear threat, a lot of people would say. This is Israel's war. This is a war that Benjamin Netanyahu has wanted for 40 years. He did a video bragging that, I've wanted this war for 40 years, and my friend Donald Trump did it for me. Um, John Kerry came out and said every president said no. We said no. Bush said no. Biden said no. Isn't it the case that this was always Netanyahu's war and Trump is just the first US president dumb enough to give it to him?

P19 raised · importance ×3 · score on the scorecard ▸

Israel's war, tail wagging the dog. The crux: Netanyahu bragged he sought this war 40 years and prior presidents refused; confront whether Israel drove/lobbied the war rather than it being Trump's own decision.

Barak Seener00:20:42 · U-112

I wouldn't assume that. Just because Israel consistently wanted it doesn't mean that it was the tail wagging the dog, that somehow Netanyahu imposed his will on President Trump. There's no evidence for that.

P19 raised again here · first raised at U-111

Verdict on P19 · Barak Seener confronted it · the scorecard row ▸

He denies the tail-wagging-the-dog thesis with a reason, that Israel wanting the war does not show Netanyahu imposed it, and argues Trump made the decision.

Mehdi Hasan00:20:56 · U-113

Not imposed, but lobbied, persuaded, cajoled, Okay, I think there's a lot of—

P19 raised again here · first raised at U-111

+0.5 R-6.1 · Interruption · Barak Seener

Barak Seener00:21:00 · U-114

there's a lot of kind of conspiratorial thinking here.

Mehdi Hasan00:21:04 · U-115

Is it conspiracy when the State Department issued a statement on its website saying the US is, quote, engaged in this conflict at the request of Israel? Is it a conspiracy theory when the US government says it out loud?

P20 raised · importance ×2 · score on the scorecard ▸

State Dept 'at request of Israel'. The crux: The State Department said the US was 'engaged in this conflict at the request of Israel': confront how this is 'conspiratorial thinking' when the government says it.

+4 R-2.2 · Dismissal by association in place of the argument · Barak Seener

Barak Seener00:21:15 · U-116 · low-confidence transcription

Well—

Barak Seener00:21:25 · U-117

And how would you then address the fact that President Trump is the one that's saying that I'm the one that calls the shots? I don't subscribe to this Tucker Carlson, Megyn Kelly view of the world in which Israel is the one that's pulling all the strings.

P19 raised again here · first raised at U-111

Verdict on P20 · Barak Seener talked around it · 8.5 DIS · the scorecard row ▸

Presented with the quoted State Department statement, he redirects to Trump's own claims of control and dismisses the argument by pundit association ('Tucker Carlson, Megyn Kelly view'). The specific documented statement is never confronted.

importance ×2 × (1 − 0.15 earned) = 1.7 of 9 weighted challenge points · × 45% (crux share of DIS) = −8.5 DIS

↳ evidence for the P19 verdict on Barak Seener · ruling prints at U-112

Mehdi Hasan00:21:38 · U-118

Salam, do you want to respond to what is Israel's role in this? Because the Israelis say, look, we're not just doing this to protect ourselves, we're doing this for the Iranian people. I've seen people at Iranian diaspora pro-war rallies waving Israeli flags.

Sanam Naraghi-Anderlini00:21:52 · U-119

We have a country of about 90 million people, so to suggest, first of all, that the diaspora waving Israeli flags is representative of a majority is questionable, to say the least. That's one thing. Second is that if we look at the role of Israel in the region and the policy of regime change that the U.S., over different administrations, has had, essentially Iraq, Syria, Libya, all of these countries were places where if there had been the opportunity, the will to foster democracy, if you want, or freedom, they would have actually challenged Israel's role vis-à-vis Palestine. They would have been a legitimate democratic force to do that. So it's to Israel's benefit to have all of these countries not only without a strongman dictator, but actually on their knees. And I think that this is exactly what they wanted to do with Iran. They want Iran to be on its knees. And again, we see it in the prosecution of the war, which is going after universities and hospitals and power plants and civilian homes and so forth. It is about destroying the infrastructure. They said they wanted to do that. So that's Israel's issue.

P21 raised · importance ×1 · score on the scorecard ▸

Regime change serves Israel. The crux: Keeping Iran (like Iraq/Syria/Libya) on its knees serves Israel by removing potential democratic challengers to its role on Palestine: confront this account of Israel's interest.

Verdict on P21 · Barak Seener wasn't asked · the scorecard row ▸

Naraghi-Anderlini's account of Israel's interest in a weakened Iran was a panel monologue; the host moved on and Seener was not given the floor. The point was flagged as not demanding a response.

Mehdi Hasan00:23:01 · U-120

We've had a lot of discussion in part 1. Thank you to our panel. In part 2 here at Conway Hall in London, we're going to hear from our studio audience very patiently waiting here in the hall. And we're going to talk to David about some of the historic issues, the grievances between the 2 countries. Don't go away. Stay tuned for the second half of Head to Head. Welcome back to Head to Head on Al Jazeera. My guest today is David Derouiche, who spent years in the Department of Defense, in the D.C. foreign policy community, shaping U.S.-Middle East policy. We're talking about Iran and America tonight. David, in part 1, we talked a lot about the war that's going on right now in the Middle East.

David Des Roches00:23:44 · U-121 · low-confidence transcription

Mm-hmm.

Mehdi Hasan00:23:45 · U-122

But let's talk a little history and context. You've acknowledged that there was animosity between 2 countries for many decades. And in 1979, let's just be very clear, Iran did take Americans as hostages. For decades, it supported militant groups like Hezbollah, which has killed Americans. But a lot of Americans seem to ignore the fact that over the years, the U.S. has posed a much bigger threat to Iran than vice versa. The US backed Saddam Hussein's illegal invasion of Iran in the 1980s. The US backed Saddam when he was gassing Iranians with chemical weapons. The US even shot down an Iranian passenger airliner in 1988, killing 290 civilians, including more than 60 children. And George H.W. Bush said at the time he would never apologize for that. Surely you have to accept, David, that Iran has legitimate grievances against the United States as well.

P22 raised · importance ×2 · score on the scorecard ▸

Iran has legitimate grievances against US. The crux: US backed Saddam's invasion, backed him while gassing Iranians, and shot down a civilian airliner killing 290: confront that Iran holds legitimate grievances.

David Des Roches00:24:35 · U-123

The dislike of the 2 countries is visceral, and it's very hard to understand. I looked at—

+0.5 R-6.1 · Interruption · Mehdi Hasan

Mehdi Hasan00:24:42 · U-124

Is it hard to understand?

Mehdi Hasan00:24:43 · U-125 · low-confidence transcription

I just listed a bunch of things.

David Des Roches00:24:43 · U-126

Hold on, but let me give you another one. So, we fought a war for years in Vietnam. We lost 58,000 soldiers. They lost probably 2 million. And yet today, when I deployed to Afghanistan, my backpack, my pistol holster were made in Vietnam. We give them ships. For some reason that has been reconciled, but there's an issue with Iran.

Mehdi Hasan00:25:06 · U-127

But do you accept that the government that you served, the military you were part of, has done some pretty bad things against Iran?

+3 C-1.2 · Partial concession that the US harmed Iran · David Des Roches

David Des Roches00:25:13 · U-128

Well, yes. I mean, helping Saddam Hussein gas Syria.

Verdict on P22 · David Des Roches confronted it · the scorecard row ▸

Asked whether the US did bad things against Iran, he answers 'Well, yes' and volunteers specific examples, engaging and partly granting the legitimate-grievances proposition.

David Des Roches00:25:21 · U-130

I don't accept the United States had knowledge and enabled Saddam Hussein in advance We gave them satellite information. We gave them targeting help.

P23 raised · importance ×2 · score on the scorecard ▸

US knew of/enabled Saddam's chemical attacks. The crux: A US defense liaison says the US had firm evidence of Iraqi chemical attacks from 1983 and still helped target Iranian troops: confront that the US enabled chemical warfare.

Verdict on P23 · David Des Roches confronted it · the scorecard row ▸

He confronts the specific chemical-weapons enabling claim by denying US advance knowledge and refusing to accept the chemical-warfare step, disputing Francona's account with reasons.

↳ evidence for the P22 verdict on David Des Roches · ruling prints at U-128

Mehdi Hasan00:25:29 · U-131

That's what the people at the time have said. Ronald Reagan said, Iraq cannot afford to lose. We must back Iraq.

David Des Roches00:25:35 · U-132

But to move to the use of chemical weapons in that is a step that I do not accept. But let me go a little further back.

P23 raised again here · first raised at U-130

↳ evidence for the P23 verdict on David Des Roches · ruling prints at U-130

Mehdi Hasan00:25:42 · U-133

I got to push back here. Rick Francona, who was a US colonel at the time, he was a defense liaison in Iraq at the time, he said the US had firm evidence of Iraqi chemical attacks beginning in 1983. He says, we didn't need them to tell them they were doing it. We already knew, and yet we still helped them target Iranian troops with those chemical weapons.

P23 raised again here · first raised at U-130

David Des Roches00:26:00 · U-134

No, we helped them target Iranian troops. The use of chemical weapons, I think, is something that remains to be seen. I know Rick Francona, but I think you're drawing a little bit too much. But let me go back further. In 1945 to 1947, the United States had a nuclear monopoly. We did not use it to force the Soviet Union to withdraw the islands in Japan that it occupied. We did not use it to force the Soviet Union to abandon the colony it established in Kaliningrad. We didn't use it to insist they leave Poland.

Mehdi Hasan00:26:31 · U-135 · low-confidence transcription

Okay.

David Des Roches00:26:31 · U-136

We did use it for one thing. We threatened the Soviet Union to get them to leave the parts of Iran that they occupied. Iran, at the time, it owes its existence as a unitary nation to American action.

Mehdi Hasan00:26:45 · U-137

I'm pretty sure Iranians would disagree with that description. But since we're going back in time further than the 1980s, let's go back to 1953. You know, the Iranians often start the clock in '53 compared to Americans in '79. And Ben Affleck as well. Ben Affleck did a great job with that. When the CIA and MI6 here from the UK overthrew Iran's elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1953, the US then supported 26 years of a brutal dictatorship under the Shah, who had a secret police that tortured people, as you know, disappeared opponents, How can the US claim, as you suggested in part 1, to want democracy and a better government in Iran when we helped get rid of the only democratic government they had?

P24 raised · importance ×2 · score on the scorecard ▸

1953 coup toppled a democratic govt. The crux: The CIA-admitted 1953 coup ousted elected PM Mossadegh (an elected MP under a parliamentary system) and led to the Shah's dictatorship and revolution: confront that a democratic government was overthrown.

David Des Roches00:27:21 · U-138

Well, first off, not a democratic government. If you look at the nature, there wasn't a popular referendum on Mossadegh.

P25 raised · importance ×1 · score on the scorecard ▸

Mossadegh appointed not elected. The crux: Defend that Mossadegh was an appointed PM serving at the Shah's pleasure, so 1953 was not the overthrow of a democratically elected government.

Verdict on P24 · David Des Roches confronted it · the scorecard row ▸

He confronts the crux by disputing that Mossadegh's government was democratic and, later, accepting the coup occurred in a Cold-War anti-communist context: engaging the proposition rather than sidestepping it.

Mehdi Hasan00:27:27 · U-139

Mohammad Mossadegh was an elected prime minister.

David Des Roches00:27:28 · U-140

Mohammad Mossadegh was an appointed prime minister.

P25 raised again here · first raised at U-138

Verdict on P25 · David Des Roches confronted it · the scorecard row ▸

He defends his own claim that Mossadegh was appointed and served at the Shah's pleasure under the Iranian constitution.

David Des Roches00:27:32 · U-142

An appointed prime minister served at the pleasure of the Shah according to the Iranian constitution.

↳ evidence for the P25 verdict on David Des Roches · ruling prints at U-140

Mehdi Hasan00:27:36 · U-143

Do you know what country you're in right now?

David Des Roches00:27:38 · U-144

Yes, I do.

Mehdi Hasan00:27:39 · U-145

Do you know how Keir Starmer became prime minister of the UK?

David Des Roches00:27:41 · U-146

Yes, I do.

Mehdi Hasan00:27:42 · U-147 · low-confidence transcription

He was appointed by the king.

Mehdi Hasan00:27:43 · U-148

Does that mean we don't have a democratic government?

David Des Roches00:27:44 · U-149

Parliamentary systems, that's how it works. Are you claiming that the electoral system in Iran in 1953 is the same as in the UK today?

P25 raised again here · first raised at U-138

Mehdi Hasan00:27:53 · U-150

No, I'm suggesting that you as an American are not understanding that parliamentary systems don't require a direct election to be democratic. He was elected to parliament in 1923. He served in the Majlis, the Iranian parliament. When he became prime minister, he was an elected member of parliament. It was a democratic government by the definition of that time. Was it a liberal democratic government? We can argue about it, but it was clearly elected by the people, and we overthrew it in a coup that the CIA long ago admitted to. Are you going to deny that?

P24 raised again here · first raised at U-137

David Des Roches00:28:20 · U-151

Do you accept? Well, let me ask you: Do you accept that the king can dismiss the prime minister? Do I accept that the the king of England can dismiss the prime minister? He could.

Mehdi Hasan00:28:28 · U-152

His mother did because it's a constitutional king, not an absolute king.

David Des Roches00:28:33 · U-153

1953 was very awkward.

Mehdi Hasan00:28:35 · U-154

Look, are you? What you hold on. Let's keep. I love this analogy.

David Des Roches00:28:39 · U-155

Your use of words—

+0.5 R-6.1 · Interruption · Mehdi Hasan

Mehdi Hasan00:28:40 · U-156

King Charles.

David Des Roches00:28:40 · U-157

I'm sorry, your use of words. Yes.

Mehdi Hasan00:28:42 · U-158

If— we know this show requires many dictionaries and thesauruses.

David Des Roches00:28:45 · U-159

You have an educated audience.

Mehdi Hasan00:28:47 · U-160

If the King of England dismissed Keir Starmer because the CIA helped him do it, yes, it would be a real problem, I assume, for the people in this room. Okay.

David Des Roches00:29:00 · U-161

The King's mother dismissed the Prime Minister of Australia. It has happened.

Mehdi Hasan00:29:05 · U-162

Many people object to that issue. It's controversial.

David Des Roches00:29:07 · U-163

And it is extraordinary. But first off, when you say democratically elected, that implies that there was a nationwide popular vote that evaluated—

Mehdi Hasan00:29:17 · U-164

No, it doesn't imply that. It implies that there was a parliamentary democracy with a government that was elected to Parliament, and we came along— and when I say we, I'm British and American— the British and the Americans came along and toppled that prime minister in a coup, which the CIA has admitted to, which then led to the Shah taking absolute power, torturing people, killing people, which then led to the Iranian Revolution, which we then complain about. We helped set that all in motion. It's called blowback for a reason.

P24 raised again here · first raised at U-137

David Des Roches00:29:41 · U-165

Well, I do accept, look, in the context of the Cold War, there were many unsavory regimes. There was a reflexive response to the fear of communism. I think that the action that the United States took in support of Britain, that was done primarily not because we were afraid of Mossadegh taking over. It was mostly because he would have been supplanted by communists, and we had a lot of reflexive anti-communism in those days.

↳ evidence for the P24 verdict on David Des Roches · ruling prints at U-138

+3 C-1.2 · Partial concession on Cold War regimes · David Des Roches

Mehdi Hasan00:30:05 · U-166

I wanna go to the panel, but I've gotta ask one quick last question.

David Des Roches00:30:07 · U-167

Sure, yes.

Mehdi Hasan00:30:08 · U-168

The Iranians have suffered heavily from sanctions. I believe Iran is the 2nd most sanctioned country in the world after Russia. You have had basically Donald Trump doing a maximum pressure campaign, which you seem to have endorsed, to help bring down the Iranian government or pressure them to the table. We've had harrowing stories of cancer patients, kids not being able to get medicines because of these sanctions. That is collective punishment of the Iranian people for 40 years. You can't blame people for being pissed at America if you've got 40 years of horrific sanctions.

P26 raised · importance ×2 · score on the scorecard ▸

Sanctions as collective punishment. The crux: Forty years of sanctions harming cancer patients and children is collective punishment justifying Iranian anger at the US: confront this.

David Des Roches00:30:35 · U-169

You, well, look, the United States is a superpower. Most countries in the world, everything that's wrong, the United States, you can either draw a line at something we did do or something we didn't do. But that being said, you've highlighted a problem with sanctions on authoritarian regimes. And if you look back at the historical record of sanctions when Saddam Hussein ran Iraq, you saw the same thing.

Verdict on P26 · David Des Roches confronted it · the scorecard row ▸

He accepts that sanctions on authoritarian regimes harm ordinary people and that Iranians might reasonably be angry, while reframing that anger toward the regime as well.

+3 C-1.2 · Partial concession that sanctions harm civilians · David Des Roches

Mehdi Hasan00:30:53 · U-170

Yes, people suffered.

David Des Roches00:30:53 · U-171

Which is Saddam Hussein still has a gold-plated toilet seat. There is an issue here, and I think that we've gotten somewhat better at looking at sanctions, but indeed, one of the problems with applying sanctions to an authoritarian regime is the people in charge get a larger piece of a shrinking pie.

↳ evidence for the P26 verdict on David Des Roches · ruling prints at U-169

Mehdi Hasan00:31:11 · U-172

That's a great high-level analysis, but my question is, if you're an Iranian person living under that sanctions regime, wouldn't you be angry at the United States?

P26 raised again here · first raised at U-168

David Des Roches00:31:18 · U-173

You might, and you might also be angry at the people who are generating the behavior that leads to sanctions. We don't sanction countries at random.

↳ evidence for the P26 verdict on David Des Roches · ruling prints at U-169

Mehdi Hasan00:31:25 · U-174 · low-confidence transcription

Okay.

Mehdi Hasan00:31:28 · U-175

Let me bring in—

+0.5 R-6.1 · Cut-in during floor handover · David Des Roches

David Des Roches00:31:29 · U-176

We might, sorry.

Mehdi Hasan00:31:29 · U-177

Let me bring in Mohammad Ali Shebani, who runs amouaj.media. These protests that happened in January that led to all the violence, we don't know how many people died, thousands of people, tens of— lots of numbers being bandied about. David mentioned that may have been one of the reasons that Donald Trump spoke out and boxed himself in. How much of that economic discontent do you attribute to sanctions? How much to Iranian government mismanagement and corruption and repression?

P27 raised · importance ×1 · score on the scorecard ▸

Cause of Iran's economic discontent. The crux: How much of the January protest discontent is attributable to US sanctions versus Iranian government mismanagement/corruption?

Mohammad Ali Shabani00:31:55 · U-178

I think it's definitely a combination of the two. I think what we need to know is that the US government, since at least 2012, has explicitly basically been saying that we want regime change. We're going to try to immiserate Iranians as much as possible, put as much pressure on them and their daily lives as possible for them to change the regime, because that's much cheaper for us. It's much easier than for us to send in our military like in Iraq in 2003. We're just going to make sure that they have no option but to basically revolt against their own rulers. to try and have a change in policy, because Iran, again, is not a democratic system. But without this sanctions regime, I find it very difficult that Iranians would rise up and be killed in the thousands because they're feeling that desperate that they have no option but to go out into the streets. I think that would be unlikely.

P27 raised again here · first raised at U-177

Verdict on P27 · Mohammad Ali Shabani confronted it · the scorecard row ▸

He answers the attribution question directly, 'a combination of the two', and argues sanctions were the trigger for mass unrest.

Mehdi Hasan00:32:36 · U-179

Let me bring in Barak Sena, who's an associate research fellow at the national security think tank, the Henry Jackson Society. We were talking about Mossadegh and the Shah of Iran. Not only did the US government back the Shah of Iran right up until his fall, But there are now hawks in the West, and I think you're included here, and you can correct me if I'm wrong, who support his son coming back to power, Reza Pahlavi, the son of a former brutal dictator who is so politically toxic, so lacking in credibility, he can't even get Donald Trump's support.

Barak Seener00:33:04 · U-180

I will correct you because I didn't advocate for any particular individual to take over. I published a report, Regime Collapse in Iran, A necessity for regional stability, with a question mark at the end. And I noted in that report that the opposition in Iran is flat, it's decentralized. You've got some that are Republicans, some that are monarchists. It's very difficult to gauge who actually has the greatest amount of support in Iran amongst those that want to see the regime toppled.

Mehdi Hasan00:33:40 · U-181

Did you speak at a rally that was organized by parliamentarians?

+2 C-3.1 · Direct answer admitting speaking at the rally · Barak Seener · low confidence: excluded from score

Barak Seener00:33:43 · U-182

I did. But I didn't advocate ever for the son of the Shah, because it's like the People Front of Judea versus the Judean People's Front.

Mehdi Hasan00:33:53 · U-183

Well, on that, we may agree. Sanam Naraghi-Andalini is here, British-Iranian civil society activist. When you look at the Iranian future, Barack just said he didn't endorse because there's so many different groups. What does a democratic future of Iran look like to you?

Sanam Naraghi-Anderlini00:34:12 · U-184

So, first of all, I think we have to recognize that the change that we're seeing in Iran is from the ground up, and the biggest success came during the Women, Life, Freedom movement. It was when women led the fray and they were nonviolent, they were on the streets, and they actually got the demands that they want. The fact that you can walk down the streets of Tehran right now, or anywhere, and see women walking around without their hijab, it's not a social issue. It's actually a political issue because the hijab was an ideological symbol of this regime. So people on the ground are doing the change from below. And economically, the problem with the sanctions is that they started with Clinton in '94. What we've done is we have squeezed the private sector, independent private sector, and we have enabled some pretty egregious elements of the regime to balloon. I just wanted to come back to one point.

Mehdi Hasan00:35:06 · U-185 · low-confidence transcription

Briefly.

Sanam Naraghi-Anderlini00:35:07 · U-186

Just, yeah, we keep going back to 1953 and 1979. When the Americans were trying to get rid of the Taliban after 2001 and 9/11, the Iranian government helped the US government in Afghanistan to get rid of them. We also know that in 2015, 2016, they were working with the US vis-à-vis ISIS in Iraq. So the idea that there is, you know, animosity for generations and they— that everybody hates each other, This is actually not this is not true.

Mehdi Hasan00:35:34 · U-187

On that note, we're going to bring in our very patient audience here in London's Conway Hall. Let me first go to this lady here in the black.

Other00:35:44 · U-188

So one of the aims of this war was to destroy Iran's nuclear capability, which I'm not sure it's achieved. But now, even if Iran gives up its entire nuclear program as part of the deal with the U.S., do you agree that a lesson Iran has learned from this? war is that they don't even need a nuclear program or a nuclear bomb anymore. They can attack the US and its allies economically through the Strait of Hormuz.

P31 raised · importance ×2 · score on the scorecard ▸

Lesson: Hormuz over nukes. The crux: Even if Iran gives up its nuclear program, has it learned it can strike the US and allies economically via the Strait of Hormuz without a bomb?

David Des Roches00:36:12 · U-189

Yeah, that's exactly right. I think I've mentioned that our Gulf partners are not really concerned about the nuclear program the same way we are because their assumption is if there is a nuclear issue, the United States will take care of it. The thing that they're really concerned about are ballistic missiles. And given the genius of Iranian engineering, they've had increases in accuracy that can achieve a strategic effect against military targets without the need for a nuclear warhead, I would argue.

P31 raised again here · first raised at U-188

Verdict on P31 · David Des Roches confronted it · the scorecard row ▸

He affirms the audience member's proposition that Iran can achieve strategic effect economically/by missiles without a nuclear warhead.

Mehdi Hasan00:36:41 · U-190

Let's go back to the audience. Gentleman here in the second row. Yes, you with the blue shirt.

Other00:36:45 · U-191

Thank you. Given Iran's crackdown on its own population, including killing, its invasion of Syria, participation in the gassing of Syrian people, and its unprovoked attacks on several Gulf states, and targeting Salman Rushdie. Can we agree that the Iranian regime is a threat to its own people, the whole Middle East, and beyond?

P32 raised · importance ×2 · score on the scorecard ▸

Iran regime a threat to all. The crux: Given crackdowns, Syria involvement, Gulf attacks and targeting Rushdie, is the Iranian regime a threat to its own people, the region and beyond?

David Des Roches00:37:15 · U-192

Yeah, absolutely. Yes.

P32 raised again here · first raised at U-191

Verdict on P32 · David Des Roches confronted it · the scorecard row ▸

He affirms the audience member's proposition that the Iranian regime is a threat to its people, the region and beyond.

Mehdi Hasan00:37:19 · U-193

Let's bring in our panel for a little bit of debate here. Mohammad, what's your response to that question? You're someone who looks knows the Iranian government. Does it have the intent expansionist intent that a lot of its opponents ascribe to it?

Mohammad Ali Shabani00:37:30 · U-194

I think you can shape the intent. I disagree with this premise that it's malign, that it's evil at heart, and it's unchangeable. That's why I think it's so important to try to work towards changing the intent, towards shifting.

P32 raised again here · first raised at U-191

Verdict on P32 · Mohammad Ali Shabani confronted it · the scorecard row ▸

He disputes the premise directly, denying the regime is malign or unchangeable and arguing intent can be shifted.

Mehdi Hasan00:37:40 · U-195

Let's go back to the audience and take some questions. But first, lady in the red jacket.

Other00:37:44 · U-196

Yeah. So the lives of Iranian women are often used as an excuse to invade the country. I was wondering, from your perspective, how can we stand in solidarity with Iranian women and pro-democracy activists without falling prey to these problematic propaganda narratives?

P28 raised · importance ×2 · score on the scorecard ▸

US instrumentalizes women's/human rights. The crux: Confront that the US invokes women's/human rights to justify wars (e.g. Afghanistan) then abandons the cause once military aims are met.

David Des Roches00:37:57 · U-197

That's probably a better question for Sanam, honestly.

Sanam Naraghi-Anderlini00:38:00 · U-198

So, what I would, what I would say, and I think we hear, is that if you, if you listen to the women's rights activists, including the ones who are in jail, and the women's movement in Iran, they have been anti-war and anti-sanctions from the get-go, and they have spoken very loudly about these issues. And the American government, every once in a while, likes to pick up women's rights as their charge to go forward, as we saw with Afghanistan. And as we saw with Afghanistan, they leave them behind the minute they, you know, have their military wins, or losses for that matter. So, I think that the worst thing that can happen is to mix women's rights with war, because—

P28 raised again here · first raised at U-196

Barak Seener00:38:40 · U-199 · low-confidence transcription

That's right.

Sanam Naraghi-Anderlini00:38:40 · U-200

It is, there's never that interest, similarly to human rights.

David Des Roches00:38:43 · U-201 · low-confidence transcription

Do you accept that? Let me, yes, let me take a step back.

David Des Roches00:38:50 · U-203

Well, no, no, let me, no, I don't.

+3 C-1.2 · Partial concession on US human-rights credibility · David Des Roches

Mehdi Hasan00:38:52 · U-204

Of course you can.

David Des Roches00:38:54 · U-205

Okay, what I'm saying is that there's a hierarchy of US interests and usually human rights, which includes women's rights. The United States sometimes takes those into account, but when it's cited as, the applause here shows that most people around the world who study that just don't believe the United States on that point. So that's something we have to work on. The question is— but sometimes it does, and I can tell you that it does have some influence, but as with other issues of state, they wax and wane. So there's no absolute answer.

P28 raised again here · first raised at U-196

Verdict on P28 · David Des Roches confronted it · the scorecard row ▸

He denies the instrumentalization framing and argues a hierarchy of interests, while conceding the US is widely disbelieved on human rights: engaging the proposition with reasons.

Mehdi Hasan00:39:25 · U-206

Do you want to stand up and wait for the mic? Yes, yes, you.

Other00:39:27 · U-207

Speaking about countries having nukes, what can the US do and what can its allies and friends do to limit countries like Iran in their ability to procure the components they need that make them a threat?

David Des Roches00:39:40 · U-208

Yeah, it's a tough issue. In 1960, there was a US national intelligence estimate that said in 5 years there would be 60 nuclear countries. So, the role of nonproliferation is better than expected, but it's still of concern. So, I think you identify people, you identify institutions, You use the levers of statecraft to try to deter it, but you also have to prepare for failure and dealing with the consequences of failure in a state becoming nuclear.

Mehdi Hasan00:40:11 · U-209

David, as someone who's worked at the Department of Defense, do you think the United States can ever lead a nonproliferation initiative in the Middle East while ignoring the fact that its top ally in the Middle East has secret nuclear weapons?

P29 raised · importance ×2 · score on the scorecard ▸

Nonproliferation vs Israel's nukes. The crux: Can the US credibly lead Middle East nonproliferation while its top ally holds undeclared nuclear weapons? Confront the double standard.

David Des Roches00:40:21 · U-210

Yeah, that's always an issue. This is always an issue that's always brought up, but I would just point out that the other states of the Middle East, Israel's nuclear program became credible in the early 1970s, and we haven't seen nuclear development in most of the other states, certainly the states aligned with the United States. So, there is a mixed record, but there are states that are trying to get our attention, Syria under Assad, Iraq under Saddam Hussein, and now Iran that are doing it. So it does complicate issues, there's no doubt about that.

Verdict on P29 · David Des Roches half-answered it · 0.8 DIS · the scorecard row ▸

He acknowledges Israel's nuclear status complicates nonproliferation but argues the regional record is mixed and other states have not proliferated; he does not squarely confront the credibility double standard.

importance ×2 × (1 − 0.5 earned) = 1 of 55 weighted challenge points · × 45% (crux share of DIS) = −0.8 DIS

Mehdi Hasan00:40:58 · U-211

Okay, let's go back to the audience. Let's go to— I want to go to the back, gentleman right at the back. Yes, you, sir.

Other00:41:05 · U-212

All right, so one thing we've neglected or we've sidestepped is the issue of Lebanon and Israeli aggression specifically on civilian targets in Lebanon. Now, if the United States is truly calling the shots, shouldn't it be working towards deterring Israel from pursuing illegal civilian targets within Lebanon during a ceasefire, which you say includes skirmishes?

David Des Roches00:41:27 · U-213

Yeah. Well, the United States deals with this whenever our partners are at war. So, the exact same question was argued by people about Saudi and Emirati actions in Yemen, for example, and there's a general sense that there's a switch somewhere in Washington We flick it and the airplanes fall from the sky. The conduct of Israeli war, the Israelis, it's very frustrating because they actually keep to the broad frameworks of the law, but then when you apply subjective issues like military proportionality, they have a broader range of proportionality than, for example, I would allow a US Army soldier to do with it. I think that questions hard—

+0.5 R-6.1 · Cut-in to press a point · Mehdi Hasan

Mehdi Hasan00:42:14 · U-214

David, David, just, just I mean, the question was about southern Lebanon. I noticed a moment ago you were very passionate about how the JCPOA enabled Iran to do ethnic cleansing in Syria. Those were your words.

Mehdi Hasan00:42:27 · U-216

We all heard you say them.

David Des Roches00:42:28 · U-217 · low-confidence transcription

Right.

Mehdi Hasan00:42:28 · U-218

Israel is ethnically cleansing Shias in southern Lebanon right now. A million people displaced from their homes. I don't see the passion or condemnation from you on that. Why?

P30 raised · importance ×3 · score on the scorecard ▸

Israel ethnic cleansing in south Lebanon. The crux: Israel driving ~1M Shia from homes with orders never to return, and telling Christian villages to bar Shias, is ethnic cleansing: confront this or defend it as temporary evacuation.

David Des Roches00:42:44 · U-219

Israel is not moving in other people to take those places. They want to. They want to. I don't.

Mehdi Hasan00:42:51 · U-220

They said so. No, you have. Many Israeli government officials have said this. In Lebanon.

David Des Roches00:42:55 · U-221

In Lebanon. They're importing people from other countries to settle in southern Lebanon.

Mehdi Hasan00:42:59 · U-222

First of all, many Israelis have called for that. But that's your definition of ethnic cleansing? That is not the definition. They've driven millions of people out of their homes and said, you can't come back. That is ethnic cleansing, especially especially based on their religious identity.

P30 raised again here · first raised at U-218

David Des Roches00:43:10 · U-223

What happened in the western suburbs of Syria where people were moved out and then other people who fought for the Iranian were moved in and took over their houses.

Mehdi Hasan00:43:19 · U-224

I'm just wondering where is your passionate denunciation for ethnic cleansing in southern Lebanon when our ally does it?

David Des Roches00:43:23 · U-225

Because I don't see ethnic cleansing. What I see is evacuation.

Verdict on P30 · David Des Roches confronted it · the scorecard row ▸

He confronts the ethnic-cleansing charge by denying it and defending the displacement as temporary evacuation with a permanence criterion: a branch the crux allowed.

Mehdi Hasan00:43:25 · U-226

When they call up Christian villages and say you cannot have any Shias in your villages, as the New York Times and DropSite both reported, that is not ethnic cleansing to say you cannot have any Shias in this part of the country? The issue is— How is that not significant?

P30 raised again here · first raised at U-218

Mehdi Hasan00:43:41 · U-228

Yes, they said you cannot come back ever.

Mehdi Hasan00:43:43 · U-229 · low-confidence transcription

That is what the Israeli Foreign Minister said.

David Des Roches00:43:45 · U-230

I do not accept that that will be the policy. If it is the policy— That is policy. Let's wait for a time and see what happens. I do not think that will happen. It is happening right now. I'm going on record now in front of this.

Mehdi Hasan00:43:57 · U-231

It's happened right now, David.

David Des Roches00:43:58 · U-232

I'm going on record right now.

Mehdi Hasan00:43:59 · U-233

We can see there are a million people who have been kicked out.

David Des Roches00:44:00 · U-234

When combat operations are over, the Shia will return to southern Lebanon and Israel will not have objections. to that.

P30 raised again here · first raised at U-218

↳ evidence for the P30 verdict on David Des Roches · ruling prints at U-225

Mehdi Hasan00:44:06 · U-235

Okay, last question of the night. No pressure, it's going to be amazing.

Other00:44:08 · U-236

I want your opinion on the fact that the next, presumably, the Prime Minister of Israel, Naftali Bennett— I'm from Turkey, I'm a lawyer— and he clearly stated that Turkey is the new Iran. If Israel does a preemptive strike against a NATO ally like Turkey, what would be the— obviously, we know what would be the US's stance, but in that situation, what is your military background and what do you think about this whole notion of the fact that preemptive strike and basically who calls the shots at this moment?

P33 raised · importance ×1 · score on the scorecard ▸

Israeli preemptive strike on Turkey. The crux: If Israel (per Bennett's 'Turkey is the new Iran') preemptively struck NATO-ally Turkey, would the US defend Turkey: and who calls the shots?

David Des Roches00:44:49 · U-237

Yeah, I do not think Israel would do a military attack against Turkey, and I think that the United States would disapprove of it. Since Erdogan took over in Turkey, the tone has shifted. So, there is a less positive view towards Turkey. It's generally not seen as a noble ally to be supported, rather as a problem to be solved.

Verdict on P33 · David Des Roches half-answered it · 0.4 DIS · the scorecard row ▸

He addresses whether Israel would strike Turkey and predicts US disapproval and a joint nuclear deterrent; the 'who calls the shots' element drew Hasan's protest that the question was not fully dealt with.

importance ×1 × (1 − 0.5 earned) = 0.5 of 55 weighted challenge points · × 45% (crux share of DIS) = −0.4 DIS

Mehdi Hasan00:45:10 · U-238

That's not really dealing with the question.

David Des Roches00:45:11 · U-239

But that will not affect, I think, that it is just inconceivable that we'd have something—

Mehdi Hasan00:45:15 · U-240

It's interesting, you mentioned a moment ago that Israel's had nukes for a while. It hasn't made other people want to get nukes. Lots of countries in the Middle East are now talking about nukes and beyond the nuke because of Israel. If you were in the Turkish government, wouldn't you want to get nukes now? When Naftali Bennett is openly threatening you?

P33 raised again here · first raised at U-236

David Des Roches00:45:28 · U-241

Turkey has a nuclear capability. It's joint with the United States. They've had it since the 1960s.

David Des Roches00:45:35 · U-243

I mean, this is beyond insane, but if there was the contemplation of some sort of action of that sort, that the United States would point out that there exists a joint nuclear capability in Turkey.

↳ evidence for the P33 verdict on David Des Roches · ruling prints at U-237

Mehdi Hasan00:45:45 · U-244

Last question from me before we wrap. There's a poll done of 40,000 people regularly across 15 Arab states, and they asked them last year, who is the biggest threat to the region? 44% said Israel in number one place. 21% said the United States in second place. These are Arab countries. And at 6% in third place, way behind, was Iran. That is a damning indictment of US and Israeli foreign policy, isn't it?

P34 raised · importance ×2 · score on the scorecard ▸

Arab poll indicts US/Israel. The crux: A 40,000-person poll found 44% name Israel and 21% the US as the region's biggest threat vs 6% Iran: confront that this indicts US/Israeli policy.

Sanam Naraghi-Anderlini00:46:10 · U-245 · low-confidence transcription

Yeah.

Mehdi Hasan00:46:10 · U-246

Damning, damning indictment.

David Des Roches00:46:11 · U-247 · low-confidence transcription

Well—

Mehdi Hasan00:46:12 · U-248

From the people on the ground.

David Des Roches00:46:14 · U-249

Well, you know, one of the burdens of the superpower is we're assumed that we run the global order like a Swiss watch, and if something bad happens, we either did it or we failed to prevent it. So we get blamed for a lot of things. We abandoned US information services in the '90s, and that was a foot shot of unimaginable magnitude. We basically have ceded the global information space. So honestly, I'm surprised that we got 21%. I think that's a better output than I was expecting.

P34 raised again here · first raised at U-244

Verdict on P34 · David Des Roches talked around it · 1.4 DIS · the scorecard row ▸

He reframes the poll as reflexive superpower-blame and ceded information space rather than confronting whether the numbers indict US/Israeli policy; he expresses surprise the US figure was not higher but does not address the substance.

importance ×2 × (1 − 0.15 earned) = 1.7 of 55 weighted challenge points · × 45% (crux share of DIS) = −1.4 DIS

Mehdi Hasan00:46:46 · U-250

Well, on that very positive note about the reputation of the United States, we'll have to leave it there. Thank you to our audience here in London's Conway Hall. Thank you to our panel of experts who came here tonight. And thank you to you, David Derouiche, for coming on Head to Head tonight and taking my questions. Appreciate it. Thank you so much. Head to Head will be back on Al Jazeera very soon. Thank you very much and good night.